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THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT-
AN OVERVIEW
In response to a continuing concern that the federal government be held
accountable to the American people, Congress enacted the Government in
the Sunshine Act1 in 1976, requiring that all portions of all meetings
conducted by federal agencies be open to the public unless they fit within
one of ten exemptions.2 The Act reflects the feeling that greater accountabil-
ity will increase the public's confidence in and understanding of the de-
cision-making process. 3 This concept is not new; the Sunshine Act parallels
open meeting provisions that are currently in force in all fifty states. 4 In
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
The Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (to be
codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552b) [hereinafter cited as Sunshine Act];
Hearings on S. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization, Research, and International
Organizations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];
Hearings on H.R. 10315 and H.R. 9868 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings];
H.R. REP. No. 880 (pt. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1 HOUSE
REPORT];
H.R. REP. No. 880 (pt. 2), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 2 HOUSE
REPORT];
S. REP. No. 1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT];
S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
1. Sunshine Act § 3(a), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (West Supp. 1977). Section 3(a) is of primary
relevance to the present discussion. It establishes the general requirement for open meetings
and sets forth the exemptions from that requirement; it also contains provisions governing
procedure and judicial review under the Act. Other sections of the Act take the form of
amendments to various existing statutes. See, e.g., Sunshine Act § 5(a) (amending 39 U.S.C. §
410(b)(1)(1970)).
2. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(b) (West Supp. 1977).
3. See SENATE REPORT 4-5; 1 HOUSE REPORT 2; 2 HOUSE REPORT 12. In a Harris survey
commissioned by the Senate Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research, and International
Organizations, public confidence in government was found to be very low. Of the 1,600 people
surveyed nationwide, 76% agreed with the statement, "too many Government leaders are just
out for their own personal and financial gain," and 78% agreed with the statement, "the trouble
with most Government leaders is that they think people will believe them when they make
promises." Senate Hearings 164-65 (testimony of Lou Harris, Harris Associates).
Meeting behind closed doors creates suspicion. This does not mean, however, that govern-
mental entities meeting in private engage in improper conduct. This Act was not designed to
police agency conduct, but rather to remove the cloak of suspicion which surrounds the secrecy
of closed meetings. Although it is hoped that open meetings will restore confidence and trust in
government, the Act's open meeting provisions are also intended to increase the public's
understanding of the governmental process whether or not the understanding results in greater
or less trust. See House Hearings 98 (prepared statement of Glen 0. Robinson, Commissioner,
Federal Communications Commission).
4. See SENATE REPORT 52 and statutes cited therein. Since the listing in the Senate Report,
New York has become the fiftieth state to enact a law providing for open meetings. N.Y. PUB.
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addition, other legislation is in effect on the federal level which opens up
various aspects of the governmental process. The Freedom of Information
Act5 (FOIA), enacted in 1966, requires agencies and executive departments
to provide a wide variety of government documents to the general public. 6
The Federal Advisory Committee Act of 19727 requires meetings of execu-
tive branch study panels and advisory and ad hoc committees to be open to
the public. 8 Likewise, the House of Representatives and the Senate have
adopted resolutions opening most meetings of congressional committees to
the public. 9
Although the Government in the Sunshine Act may not embody any
new underlying policy concerns, it provides the public with its most mean-
ingful opportunity to date to view the governmental decision-making proc-
ess first-hand. The Act is of necessity, however, a product of balancing the
need for openness with the needs for personal privacy and administrative
efficiency. The ultimate goal of openness pervades the Act's diverse and
detailed provisions, yet the drafters did not lose sight of the need to make the
administrative burden as light as practicable. This Note will provide a
general explanation of the Act's provisions, examining them in light of the
stated policy of the Act and its legislative history. Those provisions which
OFFICERS LAW §§ 90-101 (McKinney Supp. 1976). The success of state open meeting statutes
provided strong support for the federal legislation. Although many state statutes are more or
less comprehensive in their coverage than their federal counterpart and differ in other aspects,
see, e.g., Comment, Open Meeting Laws in Michigan, 53 J. URB. L. 532 (1976), they furnished
proof that openness in government is workable and that many of the concerns and fears
accompanying the change were, in hindsight, unnecessary or exaggerated. See Senate Hearings;
House Hearings; 121 CONG. REC. S19433 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff).
For useful but slightly outdated surveys of state open meeting laws see State Open Meeting
Laws, in House Hearings 323-39 (prepared by Common Cause, January 1975); J. ADANtS, STATE
OPEN MEETING LAWS: AN OVERVIEW (Freedom of Information Foundation Series No. 3, July
1974).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
6. Id. § 552(b)(2).
7. 5 U.S.C. app. I (Supp. 11 1973).
8. Id. § 10. Another bill governing federal agencies in the information area has been
introduced in the current Congress. It would direct high-level agency officials to disclose many
communications from non-agency sources concerning agency business and would also require
the officials to maintain public calendars. S. 316, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also S. 1289,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
9. S. Res. 9, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG. REC. S19371 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1975); H.R.
Res. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H5 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1975); H.R. Res. 259, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. H1448 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1973). The open meeting rules cover
"markup" sessions (committee or subcommittee sessions in which bills are studied and revised
before presentation to the full House or Senate), committee hearings and conference committee
meetings. In the House, 92% of all committee hearings and markup sessions were open to the
public in 1974 as compared to 56% in 1972. House Hearings 42 (prepared statement of Rep.
Fascell). A Common Cause study of the effects of the House open meeting rule concluded that
open meetings had not resulted in the decreased productivity feared by opponents of the rule.
Senate Hearings 78, app. I (testimony of John Gardner, Chairman, Common Cause).
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sparked the most controversy in their adoption or which are likely to prove
the most troublesome in their application will be scrutinized more
extensively.
SCOPE
The Sunshine Act requires that "every portion of every meeting of an
agency shall be open to public observation,"" I unless it falls within an
exemption. Exemptions are permissive rather than mandatory, and a strong
presumption in favor of openness exists." However, the true import of the
open meeting requirement becomes clear upon an examination of the scope
of its application. Two questions arise in this context: what is considered to
constitute a meeting, and which agencies come within the coverage of the
Act?
Agency. Although the Sunshine Act's definition of the term "agen-
cy" incorporates by reference the FOIA's definition of the term, 12 the key
definitional requirement is that an agency must be headed by a "collegial
body" 1 3 of not less than two members, the majority of whom are appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 14 Included within the scope of
10. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(b), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(b) (West Supp. 1977). The Act does not
address itself specifically to opportunities for public participation. Subsection (b) requires only
that meetings be open "to public observation." Agencies are expected to provide space,
visibility and acoustics which are adequate to ensure that the right to observe will be meaning-
ful. See CONFERENCE REPORT 11; 122 CONG. REc. H7867 (daily ed. July 28, 1976) (remarks of
Rep. Abzug).
1I. See SENATE REPORT 3, 20. While exemptions are "permissive" in the sense that a
meeting may be closed pursuant to one of the exemptions, this discretion is not unlimited. An
agency must determine whether it would be in "the public interest" to open the meeting to the
public. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c) (West Supp. 1977). While an agency would
appear to have a great deal of discretion in assessing the public interest in openness, it should be
possible to challenge abuses of that discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act. See
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). If the public interest so
requires, the meeting must be open.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (Supp. IV 1974). The definition in the FOIA in turn relies on the
Administrative Procedure Act's definition of the term, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970). The FOIA
definition states that an "agency" includes
any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Govern-
ment controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the
Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent
regulatory agency.
13. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(a)(l), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977). The term
"collegial body" was intended to encompass those who have common duties. 1 HousE REPORT
7.
14. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(a)(l), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977). Recent litigation
regarding the scope of the definition of "agency" under the FOIA and the Administrative
Procedure Act raises the possibility that the definition of "agency" in the Sunshine Act may
cause similar problems of application. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft, 421 U.S.
168, 187-88 (1975); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-48 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). These cases suggest that administrative bodies may or may not fall within the
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the definition are any subdivisions of an agency which are authorized to act
on its behalf.' 5 Therefore, panels or boards composed of two or more
agency members which are authorized to conduct hearings, make prelimi-
nary decisions, or submit recommendations are subject to the provisions of
the Act even if their actions are not final in nature. 16
Excluded from coverage are advisory committees 17 and agencies
headed by only one official.18 However, an agency such as the United States
Postal Service19 or the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),
which relies upon a single administrator for day-to-day supervision but is
governed by a collegial body, is considered to be an agency for purposes of
the Act, and is therefore subject to its provisions. 20 It is anticipated that the
definition of "agency" depending upon the function they are performing in a particular
instance.
Suggestions were made to replace the definition with a list of all of the administrative
entities which Congress intended to be covered by the Act. I HOUSE REPORT 35 (additional
views of Rep. Horton); id. at 540 (letter of Dec. 8, 1975 from the Office of Management and
Budget to Rep. Brooks); 122 CONG. REc. H7898-99 (daily ed. July 28, 1976) (remarkes of Rep.
Kindness).
15. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(a)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(l) (West Supp. 1977).
16. 1 HousE REPORT 7.
17. Advisory committees are governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.
app. 1 (Supp. III 1973). The Sunshine Act amends the Federal Advisory Committee Act to make
the opening of advisory committee meetings subject to the exemptions contained in the
Sunshine Act. Sunshine Act § 5(c) (amending 5 U.S.C. app. I § 10 (Supp. III 1973)). Prior to this
amendment, advisory committee meetings were subject to the exemptions contained in the
FOIA. This amendment represents an attempt to eliminate the problems that were caused by
making meetings subject to exemptions designed for documents. CONFERENCE REPORT 26.
18. Even though a single-headed agency may be run by the agency head along with his
deputies and assistants, they are not a collegial body since they do not share common duties. A
commission in which one commissioner serves as chairman would, however, come within the
definition of an agency.
One reason for excluding single-headed agencies from coverage under this Act's open
meeting provisions concerns the nature of their decision-making process. Unlike the give-and-
take nature of decision-making in collegial agencies, the director of a single-headed agency is
the only person ultimately responsible for the agency action. This structural difference might
account for the use of different standards. House Hearings 192 (statement of Mary C. Lawton,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice).
Two practical justifications were also advanced for excluding single-headed agencies from
Sunshine Act coverage. First, there was concern that the bill would not pass if it included both
multiheaded and single-headed agencies. House Hearings 74 (remarks of Rep. Abzug). Second,
it was felt by some members of Congress that it would be better to experiment with multiheaded
agencies before extending the concept to single-headed agencies as well. See House Hearings
225 (remarks of Rep. Fascell: "we wanted to walk before we started running"). Congress felt
that single-headed agencies should eventually be subjected to open meeting requirements, but
decided that this would best be achieved through separate legislation designed especially for
those agencies. SENATE REPORT 17.
19. The Sunshine Act amends 39 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1) (1970) to make its provisions specifical-
ly applicable to the United States Postal Service. Sunshine Act § 5(a) (amending 39 U.S.C. §
410(b)(1) (1970)).
20. CONFERENCE REPORT 10-11.
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Act's coverage will extend to forty-seven agencies. 21
Meeting. A "meeting" is defined as "the deliberations of at least the
number of individual agency members required to take action on behalf of
the agency where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct
or disposition of official agency business .... "22 Thus, a meeting is not
limited to the situation in which agency members convene for the express
purpose of discussing agency business. Congress rejected the "purpose
test" to restrict the opportunity for circumvention of the open meeting
requirement by agency members. 23 This definition ensures that not only the
final announcement of the agency's action or decision but all of the discus-
sion leading up to the final decision will be open to the public.
In order to constitute a meeting for the purposes of this section, there
must be a substantive discussion of official agency business. A social
gathering or casual encounter is not required to be opened to the public if
there are only passing references to agency matters. 24 Similarly, a speech
referring to agency affairs which is made by an agency member and attended
by several other agency members does not constitute a meeting since there is
no "joint conduct" or disposition of business. 25 On the other hand, confer-
ence telephone calls may be covered under this section if they include
discussion of official agency business and involve the requisite number of
agency members. 26 The determinative factors are not where and how the
discussions are held, but rather what is discussed and by whom.
To be considered a meeting for the purposes of the Sunshine Act,
discussions must be engaged in by a quorum of the agency (or subdivision
authorized to act on its behalf). Therefore, a discussion between a Commis-
sioner and his or her staff employees would not be a meeting. The quorum
requirement presents a potential problem: agencies may avoid open meeting
21. For a list of the agencies the Sunshine Act is expected to govern, see SENATE REPORT
15-16. In the final analysis, however, the definition itself will determine which agencies will be
covered. The Senate listing has already caused two agencies to question their inclusion. Both
the Indian Claims Commission and the Railroad Retirement Board claim that they are not
subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and therefore should not be
subject to the Sunshine Act. See House Hearings 422-23, 467-68.
22. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(a)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
23. See CONFERENCE REPORT 10-11.
24. SENATE REPORT 18; 122 CONG. REC. H7867 (daily ed. July 28, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Abzug).
25. SENATE REPORT 18.
In the Senate and House versions of the Act-S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. and H.R. 11656,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975)-a discussion was considered a "meeting" if it "concerned" the
joint conduct or disposition of agency business ("official" agency business in S. 5). The
Sunshine Act definition is more narrow, requiring the deliberations to "determine or result in
the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business." Sunshine Act § 3(a)(a)(2), 5
U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
26. CONFERENCE REPORT 11.
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requirements by engaging in discussions and making preliminary decisions
in small groups which do not constitute a quorum of agency members.
27
Another and more direct way for agency members to avoid open
meetings is to consider agency business in writing. Consideration of agency
business through circulation of written material among individual agency
members is generally not subject to the open meeting requirement. 28 In
addition, the written memoranda would not have to be disclosed under the
FOIA's mandatory disclosure provisions if they fell within the FOIA's
exemption for "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
''29
Agency use of written memoranda could thus prove to be a favorite
technique for circumventing the requirements of the Act. 30 Fortunately,
however, written consideration of agency matters is to some extent self-
limiting. On controversial issues, written memoranda will generally provide
27. The Attorney General of Florida suggested that the quorum requirement in the federal
Act be changed to reach all meetings of two or more members (as Florida's sunshine law
requires, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (1975); Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. App.
1973)) in order to avoid small-group decision-making. He noted that there have been no
problems with Florida's requirement that two or more members hold open meetings. House
Hearings 59-61 (remarks of Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, State of Florida).
The apparent concern regarding such a change is whether the tighter standard would be too
inflexible and thus cause widespread confusion and litigation. While it is difficult to predict how
either standard would fare, future experience under the Sunshine Act should provide some
degree of comparison since there are agencies covered by the Act in which two members
constitute a quorum.
28. CONFERENCE REPORT 11. There are two situations, however, in which the information
contained in intra-agency memoranda is required to be disclosed under the Sunshine Act. If the
contents of a memorandum are discussed in a meeting, and the information contained in the
memorandum is not exempt under any of the exemptions of the Sunshine Act, then the
discussion of the memorandum must be open to the public. See Sunshine Act § 3(a)(b), 5
U.S.C.A. § 552b(b) (West Supp. 1977). Similarly, if the contents of a memorandum are
discussed in a closed meeting, and the information contained in the memorandum is not exempt
under the Sunshine Act, then the portion of the verbatim transcript covering that discussion will
have to be made public. See notes 120-27 infra and accompanying text. It should be noted that
the information contained in the memorandum would not be entitled to protection under
Exemption 3 for "matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than § 552 of
this title)" since the FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552) is specifically excluded from the exemption's
protection. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(3) (West Supp. 1977). Absent this
exclusion, the argument would be that the information fell within the intra-agency memoran-
dum exemption of the FOIA, see note 29 infra.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970); see Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information
Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366, 382-85 (discussing the limitations on this exemption which
have been derived from the statutory language).
Such material would have to be disclosed under the FOIA, however, if it were properly
characterizable as a final opinion. The FOIA requires that "[elach agency . . . shall make
available for public inspection and copying final opinions ...made in the adjudication of
cases." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1977); see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421
U.S. 132 (1975); Note, supra at 372-82.
30. See House Hearings 168 (statement of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission).
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an insufficient basis for informed decision-making, and will necessarily give
way to oral debate on the pros and cons of the proposed agency action.
A final and most important consideration is that many agencies routine-
ly consider noncontroversial agency matters in writing in order to mitigate
their heavy workloads. 31 Requiring written consideration of agency matters
to be subject to the open meeting requirement could therefore seriously
impede the administrative bureaucracy. 32
The Sunshine Act could undoubtedly have been more tightly drawn to
close off such loopholes. 33 If it had been, however, the Act would have
become inflexible to the point that administrative efficiency might be seri-
ously impaired and the quality of the work product adversely affected.
While it is in the public interest to have open government, it is also in the
public interest to have a government which operates as efficiently and
productively as possible. Therefore, enough flexibility had to be retained to
avoid straight-jacketing the agencies subject to the Act's provisions.
Although the definition of the term "meeting" might at first appear to
be a source of confusion to agency members, no significant problems should
result. The requirement of a quorum and joint action, and the legislative
history on the meeting question34 should help to allay any fears concerning
the effect of stopping to chat or going out to lunch with other agency
members. Drawing the line when only two agency members constitute a
quorum may be more difficult, but if there is any question as to whether a
discussion satisfies the definition of a meeting, the presumption is in favor
of openness-the Act is premised on the belief that the open meeting
requirement should not adversely affect the quality of decision-making, 35
3 1. See, e.g., House Hearings 520 (letter of Dec. 9, 1975 from Charles A. Tobin, Secretary,
Federal Trade Commission, to Rep. Abzug).
32. There would also seem to be obvious practical difficulties in applying the open meeting
provisions to written consideration of agency business.
33. Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson of the Federal Communications Commission, how-
ever, suggested that tight drafting might be ineffective, because
if agency officials are going to evade [the Act], then there is nothing that legislation
can do to stop it . . . . I think the point is to try to enlist as much as possible the
voluntary acceptance and coordination-an acceptance of the spirit of the legislation,
and the one way of doing this is to provide some degree of flexibility.
House Hearings b2.
34. See notes 2.4-25 supra and accompanying text.
35. Perhaps the most vocal criticisms of the Act have been that open meetings will inhibit
candid expression of controversial views and that open meetings will encourage grandstanding.
See House Hearings 134-35 (statement of Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Federal Reserve Sys-
tem); id. 183-84, 186 (prepared statement of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission). Although an audience might be somewhat inhibiting at first, it is
reasonable to expect that agency members would adapt rapidly. While grandstanding will occur
to some extent in open meetings, speaking for the benefit of the audience or the record may
diminish as open meetings become the rule rather than the exception.
If the fear of inhibition stems less from a concern for self-consciousness than from a
paternalistic concern that candid expression will not be beneficial to the public, it should be
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and that any resulting administrative burden 36 is outweighed by the benefit
to the public.
EXEMPTIONS
It is recognized in the Act that some agency deliberations involve
sensitive material that may warrant an exception to application of the
general open meeting requirement. The Act sets forth ten exemptions from
this requirement.37 Each reflects Congress' belief that the benefits of public
remembered that a policy determination to the contrary has been made by Congress in drafting
and enacting this legislation. A Harris-opinion survey found that 72% of the people questioned
believed that "most Government leaders are afraid to treat the public as adult and tell them the
hard truth about inflation, energy, and other subjects," Senate Hearings 165 (testimony of Lou
Harris, Harris Associates). Agency members are not permitted by the Act to make their own
determinations concerning the proper degree of openness to present to the public except when
the meeting falls within one of the ten exemptions of subsection (c), in which case they may
decide to close it.
Proof that an open meetings policy can work in a federal agency comes from the experi-
ence of the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, which formally adopted an
open meetings policy in 1973. See House Hearings 48-57 (statement of Richard 0. Simpson,
Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission). The Chairman of the Commission stated
that open meetings have neither inhibited expression nor increased grandstanding. Id. at 74.
While admitting that "rules on 'openness' are not always easy to live with," he claimed that the
experience of the Commission shows that the "difficulties perceived are over-estimated and
become trivial when compared to the benefits of increased public confidence." Id. at 54. Other
commissions with open meeting policies are the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, see
House Hearings 358, and the Federal Election Commission, see id. at 497; 121 CONG. REC.
S19433 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff).
It is also widely believed that not only will open meetings not impair decision-making, but
they will actually result in improved decision-making by encouraging increased attendance,
greater preparedness, and better organization of meetings. See SUBCOMM. ON REORGANIZATION,
RESEARCH, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPER-
ATIONS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE: RESPONSES TO SUBCOMM. QUES-
TIONNAIRE ON S. 260 67 (Comm. print 1974) (letter of August 8, 1973 from Prof. Kenneth C.
Davis to Sen. Ribicoff); House Hearings 98 (prepared statement of Glen 0. Robinson, Commis-
sioner, Federal Communications Commission); 121 CONG. REC. S19433 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1975)
(remarks of Sen. Ribicoff). Open meetings are also expected to minimize information leaks and
end speculation about what transpired "behind closed doors," which often can be more
injurious than the facts themselves. See House Hearings 98-99 (prepared statement of Glen 0.
Robinson, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission); Senate Hearings 217-18
(testimony of Henry Geller, former general counsel of the Federal Communications
Commission).
36. The administrative burden is eased to some extent by the provision that any delibera-
tions engaged in pursuant to subsections (d) and (e) (regarding the closing of a meeting and
advance public notice of a meeting, see notes 95-119 infra and accompanying text) are not
considered to be meetings and are thus not subject to the open meeting requirement. Sunshine
Act § 3(a)(a)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977). For example, if agency members
vote on whether to close a meeting, that vote does not have to be opened to the public.
37. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c) (West Supp. 1977). In addition, subsection
(c) exempts from disclosure any information which subsections (d) and (e), pertaining to voting
on closing meetings and public notice of meetings (see notes 95-119 infra), would otherwise
require to be disclosed. Such information must, however, also fall within one of the specific
exemptions enumerated in subsection (c). Id.
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observation may be outweighed by other factors such as the right to privacy
or the need for secrecy. As with the FOIA,38 the exemptions from the
Sunshine Act are permissive, not mandatory; an agency may close a meet-
ing or any portion of a meeting if it is protected by one of the exemptions,
unless the agency determines that "the public interest requires otherwise"
39
or the meeting is required to be kept open pursuant to any other law.
n0
Closure of one portion of a meeting should not lead to closure of any other
portions unless they too are protected by an exemption.
In order to close a meeting, an agency need not be certain that
exemptible information will be disclosed. A meeting may be closed if it is
"likely to" 41 disclose such information-if it is "more likely than not that
the event or result in question will occur. '42 If only a possibility of such
disclosure is apparent, however, the meeting must be open.43 The use of the
word "likely" in describing when the exemptions may be invoked is
designed to keep an agency from having to bear the unreasonable burden of
proving certainty of disclosure in order to close a portion of a meeting, while
making clear that the Act's open meeting requirement cannot be circum-
vented simply by claiming that there is a "possibility" of disclosure.
Many of the Sunshine Act's exemptions are similar or identical to
exemptions found in the FOIA, 4 and were adopted with regard for the
judicial interpretations of those exemptions. These include:
(1) Exemption 1: Matters pertaining to national defense or foreign
policy;45
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970); see Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information
Act-1976, 1977 DUKE L.J. 532.
39. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c) (West Supp. 1977). See note t1 supra.
40. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(1) (West Supp. 1977).
41. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c) (West Supp. 1977).
42. CONFERENCE REPORT 15.
43. If disclosure of exemptible information becomes imminent during a meeting, an agency
may close that portion of the meeting pursuant to subsection (d)(2) of the Act. Sunshine Act §
3(a)(d)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
45. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(l), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(1) (West Supp. 1977). This exemption
covers material which is authorized by executive order to be kept secret in the "interests of
national defense or foreign policy," and which is properly classified under such an order. Id. In
order for material to be "properly classified" it must currently be entitled to its original
classification under the applicable executive order. I HOUSE REPORT 9. An agency must close a
meeting if it is likely to disclose classified information; although the exemption imposes no
specific obligation to do so, it would be an abuse of an agency's discretion to disclose the
information, see SENATE REPORT 21 (agency lacks authority to declassify material previously
classified by another agency), and disclosure may also constitute a crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 798
(1970). The exemption is identical to Exemption I of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1974), and parallel construction is expected. SENATE REPORT 20. There has been little definitive
law on the FOIA's exemption since Congress amended it in 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1974) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970)), to overrule EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973),
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(2) Exemption 2: Internal agency personnel rules and practices; 46
(3) Exemption 3: Information specifically exempted from disclosure
by statute; 47
(4) Exemption 4: Trade secrets and commercial or financial
information;4
8
which had made the judiciary virtually a rubber stamp for executive decisions classifying
information. See Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1973, 1974
DUKE L.J. 251, 252-59. As a result of the amendment, the judiciary now has power to determine
whether documents are "both. . . classified and classifiable." Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby,
509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
46. Meetings concerning an agency's personnel rules and practices may be closed to the
public, Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(2) (West Supp. 1977), in order to protect
the privacy of the agency staff and to facilitate the handling of internal management matters.
This exemption extends only to internal matters and does not cover inter-agency personnel
programs. Cf. 2 HoUsE REPORT 35 (Civil Service Commission suggestion that exemption be
modified to cover such programs). Discussions concerning employees dealings with the public
are also not exempt. SENATE REPORT 21. Exemption 2 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970),
is the parallel provision for this exemption, and the Supreme Court's construction of the FOIA
exemption in Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) should assist in the
interpretation of the Sunshine Act. CONFERENCE REPORT 15. Rose held that Exemption 2 of the
FOIA is not generally applicable to matters in which the public has a legitimate and significant
interest. "Rather," the Court stated, "the general thrust of the exemption is simply to relieve
agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the
public could not reasonably be expected to have an interest." 425 U.S. at 369-70. Use of this
exemption is basically restricted to routine housekeeping matters in which the public has little
interest. See Note, supra note 38, at 545-47.
47. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(3) (West Supp. 1977). See notes 54-59
infra and accompanying text.
48. Id. § 3(a)(c)(4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(4) (West Supp. 1977). This exemption is identical
to the trade secrets exemption of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970); its case law should
govern the Sunshine Act provision. CONFERENCE REPORT 15; see Charles River Park "A", Inc.
v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498
F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1974,
1975 DUKE L.J. 416, 441-44. The exemptions cover trade secrets and commercial or financial
information which is received from a person and which is either confidential or privileged. The
court in National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
stated that material is confidential for the purposes of Exemption 4 of the FOIA
if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to
impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2)
to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the
information was obtained.
The same standard will no doubt be applied to Exemption 4 of the Sunshine Act. (The House
Report indicates that matter subject to certain evidentiary privileges, such as the physician-
patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege, qualifies under the "privileged" branch of
this exemption. I HOUSE REPORT 10).
Information given to an agency by another agency may be protected by this exemption only
if the first agency received the information from a person and the information otherwise
qualifies under this provision. SENATE REPORT 23. The Sunshine Act is subject to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's definition of "person," an important term in this exemption, which
includes an "individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization
other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1970).
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(5) Exemption 6: Information the disclosure of which would be an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;49
(6) Exemption 7: Investigatory records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes; 50
(7) Exemption 8: Information contained in or relating to examination,
operating, or condition reports on financial institutions. 51
49. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(6), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(6) (West Supp. 1977). See notes 63-73
infra and accompanying text.
50. Id. § 3(a)(c)(7), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(7) (West Supp. 1977). The information is exempt
if it would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair
trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record
compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investi-
gation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investiga-
tion, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose
investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of
law enforcement personnel.
Id. Meetings may be closed only if the information which would be disclosed falls within one of
these statutorily defined categories. Exemption 7 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV
1974), is almost identical in form, the only difference being that the Sunshine Act also covers
non-written information which, if written, would be included in the investigatory records.
Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(7), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(7) (West Supp. 1977). The FOIA was amended
in 1974 to its present reading to give it more limited application, see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 164-65 (1975), reversing a previous judicial trend which had given investiga-
tory records virtually a blanket exemption. See Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489
F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
To qualify for this exemption, the records or non-written information involved must
concern specific persons. SENATE REPORT 23. Discussion involving general records, such as
annual surveys, is not covered. Id. The legal strategy of an investigation may be protected if
disclosure might frustrate the implementation of the strategy and interfere with enforcement
proceedings. Id. If a discussion would disclose investigatory techniques or procedures, this
exemption may be applicable, but only to the extent that the information has not already been
disclosed to the public by judicial proceedings, the media, or other sources. I HOUSE REPORT
11. Although the records or information must pertain to a specific person, the "investigatory
techniques and procedures" protected may be general in nature. See id.
Information supplied by a confidential informant is exempted only if disclosure would
reveal the identity of the informant. SENATE REPORT 23. For the purposes of this exemption,
another federal agency is not considered a confidential source. I HOUSE REPORT 11.
Subparagraph (D), protecting the identity of a confidential source, is intended to protect
individuals, as is subparagraph (C), covering unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. See
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AcT 9 (1975).
For a discussion of the comparable FOIA exemption, see Note, supra note 38, at 547-53;
Note, supra note 29, at 399-408.
51. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(8), 5 U.S.C.A. 552b(c)(8) (West Supp. 1977). Such reports are
"prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions," id., and contain highly sensitive financial information
"relevant to both monetary policy and bank regulatory functions." House Hearings 144
(remarks of Thomas O'Connell, Counsel to the Chairman, Federal Reserve System). Bank
regulatory agencies preparing such reports are the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. SENATE REPORT 25. An identical
exemption is contained in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1970), and the Sunshine Act
exemption should be interpreted in a consistent manner. SENATE REPORT 25.
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Congress' intent that these provisions be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the FOIA52 should help to minimize litigation. As many issues con-
cerning the FOIA's exemptions have already been litigated, 53 the following
discussion will focus only on those provisions of the Sunshine Act on which
current FOIA case law sheds little light.
Exemption 3: Specific statutory exemptions from disclosure. This pro-
vision allows the agency to close a meeting or a portion of a meeting to
avoid disclosure of information specifically exempted from disclosure by
another statute, other than the FOIA.54 To fit within this exemption, a
statute must either leave no discretion on the issue of disclosure, set forth
specific criteria for withholding, or describe specific types of information to
be withheld. 55 The FOIA has been amended by the Sunshine Act so that
both statutes now contain substantially identical third exemptions;56 much of
the case law for the previous FOIA exemption is therefore no longer valid. 57
A permissive statute will come under this exemption only if the deci-
sion to withhold information under that statute is to some degree nondis-
cretionary; a standard to be applied or a listing of types of exemptible
information must be included in the statute. 58 Thus, for example, section
1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 would not be covered by this
exemption since it permits withholding of information if it is believed that
disclosure "is not required in the interest of the public." 59
52. See SENATE REPORT 20-25; I House REPORT 10.
53. See notes 45-51 supra and materials cited therein for discussions of the parallel FOIA
exemptions.
54. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
Although the Sunshine Act does not require an agency to close any meeting, it would be an
abuse of discretion to hold an open meeting if another statute requires nondisclosure of the
information to be discussed therein. In addition, the agency would often need to close its
meeting in order to avoid statutory sanctions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970) (informa-
tion obtained by EEOC related to unlawful employment practices may not be publicly disclosed
prior to the institution of proceedings involving such information, on penalty of a fine of not
more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year).
55. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
56. The exemption in each statute specifically excludes the other act from its coverage; the
provisions are otherwise identical. Compare id. with 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970), as amended by
Sunshine Act § 5(b).
57. The language of the Sunshine Act is direct response to the Supreme Court's holding in
FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), construing the related exemption in the
FOIA. CONFERENCE REPORT 14; See Note, supra note 38, at 553-55.
58. The language in the exemption specifically excluding the FOIA (which permits but does
not require withholding) from coverage under this provision is an indication of Congress' intent
to extend coverage to other permissive statutes. See also 122 CONG. REc. H7897 (daily ed. July
28, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Fascell and Rep. McCloskey).
59. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970). Another statute which is expressly mentioned in the Confer-
ence Report as not being protected by Exemption 3 of the Act is section 1106 of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970) (information may not be disclosed, except as the
Secretaries of HEW or Labor may prescribe by regulations). CONFERENCE REPORT 14.
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Exemption 5: Criminal accusations or formal censure. Discussions
which involve formal censure or an accusation that a "specific" person has
committed a "specified" crime may be conducted in private.6" The agency
must be considering formal action, although it is not necessary that the
formal action ever be taken. 61 This exemption recognizes that opening such
a discussion to public observation could cause irreparable harm to reputa-
tion. Corporations, partnerships, organizations, and associations, as well as
individuals, are protected by this provision. 62
Exemption 6: Unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. An exemp-
tion may be triggered if a meeting or portion thereof is likely to result in
disclosure of personal information and such disclosure would be a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.' '63 Discussions involving a re-
view of an individual's professional competence, finances, health, or al-
leged drinking habits may be closed under the exemption. 64 Since the
purpose of this provision is to protect an individual's privacy, any discus-
sion which the individual prefers to have open to the public should not be
closed.65
Exemption 6 should not be invoked automatically whenever there is a
discussion which involves personal information relating to an individual;
such unrestricted use would run counter to the stated policy of the Act. 66
Instead, the agency should employ a balancing test like that used under the
similar exemption in the FOIA to determine whether the proposed invasion
of privacy would be "clearly unwarranted.''67 A balancing test will allow
the agency to consider the status of the individual concerned in deciding
60. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(5), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(5) (West Supp. 1977).
61. See SENATE REPORT 22.
62. See note 48 supra for the Administrative Procedure Act's definition of "person,"
which is applicable to this exemption.
63. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(6), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(6) (West Supp. 1977).
64. SENATE REPORT 21; 1 HOUSE REPORT 11.
65. SENATE REPORT 22; 1 HOUSE REPORT 11.
66. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that the public is entitled
to the fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of the
Federal Government. It is the purpose of this Act to provide the public with such
information while protecting the rights of individuals and the ability of the Govern-
ment to carry out its responsibilities.
Sunshine Act § 2.
67. In Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976), the Supreme Court dealt with
the parallel FOIA exemption which covers "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970). The Court cited with approval the Senate Report's statement that
[t]he phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" enunciates a policy
that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's
private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's
right to governmental information.
425 U.S. at 372 (quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)).
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whether a discussion can be closed. 68 Private individuals and public officials
should be treated differently, since the public has a vested interest in the
competence of a public official and thus in knowledge of all the factors that
may affect the carrying out of his or her public duties.6 9 The use of a
balancing test may also, however, make administration of this exemption
more difficult than administration of those exemptions which set forth
particular criteria to guide the agency. This may, in turn, lead to increased
litigation.
It could be argued that the criminal accusation or formal censure
exemption is redundant in light of the privacy exemption. The privacy
exemption applies only to individuals, 70 however, while the criminal ac-
cusation exemption is broader in scope. 71 There could therefore be no
overlap if a charge were brought against a corporation. In addition, unlike
the exemption for criminal accusation or formal censure, the privacy exemp-
tion requires a balancing of interests. Thus, there may be instances in which
discussions concerning the formal censure of or criminal accusations against
an individual covered by the criminal accusation or formal censure exemp-
tion would not be covered by the privacy exemption because of a determina-
tion that the invasion of privacy was not "clearly unwarranted." Congress
has undertaken to extend protection in the area of formal censure or criminal
accusation regardless of the strength or weakness of the privacy or reputa-
tion interests of the parties involved. 72 This judgment is, of course, always
subject to the requirement that an agency open a meeting, regardless of the
applicability of an exemption, if it finds that the public interest so requires. 73
68. See SENATE REPORT 21-22; 1 HOUSE REPORT 1I. One of the House bills excluded "any
officer or employee of the United States or any branch, department, agency or establishment
thereof, with respect to his official duties or employment" from coverage under this exemp-
tion, as well as the exemption concerning criminal accusations and formal censure. H.R. 10315,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c)(3)(4)(1975).
69. As the Supreme Court noted in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964):
Of course, any criticism of the manner in which a public official performs his duties
will tend to affect his private, as well as his public reputation. . . . [But there is a]
paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning
public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an
official's fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to
fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though
these characteristics may also affect the official's private character.
Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
70. The legislative history refers only to an individual's privacy. See SENATE REPoRT 21-22;
I HOUSE REPORT 11. In addition, the House Report specifically stated that the provision applied
only to individuals. I HOUSE REPORT 12.
71. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
72. The balancing approach appears less appropriate if corporations or public officials are
involved, since both may be less deserving of this type of protection than private individuals.
See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note I 1 supra.
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Exemption 9: Premature disclosure having specific adverse effects.
The ninth exemption74 applies in certain instances in which premature
disclosure of information would have adverse effects on the continued
efficient operation of an agency. Subparagraph (A) applies only to agencies
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve
Board75 which regulate "currencies, securities, commodities, or financial
institutions. "6 These agencies may hold closed meetings if disclosure of
the information involved would be premature and likely to lead to "signifi-
cant" financial speculation or "significantly" imperil the stability of any
financial institution. 77 Meetings involving the financial stability of a federal
reserve bank or the possibility of suspension of trading in a certain security
could be closed under this exemption. 78
There are three exemptions under the Sunshine Act which deal with
financial information-Exemption 4, covering privileged or confidential
financial information; 79 Exemption 8, covering examination, operating, or
condition reports on financial institutions; 80 and Exemption 9(A). It is likely
that some discussions of financial information will fall within more than one
of these exemptions. 8 1 If Congress had simply included one exemption for
financial information it might well have been so broad that it would have
encompassed not only those situations covered by the exemptions, as they
now stand, but other cases as well in which an exemption would be
unjustified. 82 The inclusion of three exemptions gives the public a clearer
idea of the reason for closure than would a broad exemption which could be
cited uncritically as support for closing all meetings involving financial
information.
Subparagraph (B) of Exemption 9 applies to any agency and covers
information which, if prematurely disclosed, would be likely to "signifi-
74. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(9), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(9) (West Supp. 1977).
75. SENATE REPORT 24.
76. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(9)(A), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(9)(A) (West Supp. 1977). Included
within the term "financial institutions" are
banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, brokers and dealers in securities
or commodities, exchanges dealing in securities or commodities, such as the New
York Stock Exchange, investment companies, investment advisors, self-regulatory
organizations subject to 15 U.S.C. § 78s, and institutional managers as defined in 15
U.S.C. § 78m(f).
SENATE REPORT 24.
77. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(9)(A), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(9)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
78. SENATE REPORT 24.
79. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
80. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
81. See House Hearings 143.
82. Outdated financial information which is neither privileged nor confidential, nor con-
tained in an operating, examination, or condition report, and the release of which posed no
danger of speculation or threat to financial stability, could easily fall within a vague general
exemption.
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cantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action."I' This provi-
sion is explicitly inapplicable, however, if the nature or content of the
agency's proposed action has already been disclosed by the agency itself,84
or in cases in which an agency is required by law to disclose such informa-
tion before it takes final action. 85
If, however, disclosure of proposed agency actions is made by a source
other than the agency, the agency is still protected by this provision. 86 If the
purpose of this provision is to avoid "significant frustration" in the im-
plementation of a proposed action, then the policy of protecting information
already disclosed by another source is questionable, since most of the
potential harm will probably have occurred already. In addition, the policy
seems unsound if one accepts the view that transcripts made of closed
meetings are to be released once there is no longer any need for the
exemption. 87 According to this view, if information regarding a proposed
agency action were disclosed by a source other than the agency, and the
agency subsequently closed a meeting in which the information was dis-
cussed, the transcript of the meeting would have to be made available, since
there would no longer be any reason for the exemption. The information
would thus reach the public notwithstanding closure of the meeting.
Compelling the opening of meetings in which the information dis-
cussed has not been disclosed by the agency but rather has been "leaked" to
the public might tend to encourage such unauthorized disclosures. Neverthe-
less, the policy of the Act is to provide the public with the "fullest
practicable information. '"88 Once the nature or content of the proposed
action has been disclosed-by whatever means-it is unlikely that holding
an open meeting would significantly increase the chances that implementa-
tion of the agency's action would be frustrated. Since this concern and not
the source of the disclosure should be the primary focus of subparagraph (B)
the decision to allow closure if a source other than the agency has previously
released the information appears misguided. Subparagraph (B) of Exemp-
tion 9 is worded loosely. It is somewhat of a catch-all, designed to ensure
that the efficacy of agency actions is not sacrificed entirely to the goals of
83. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(9)(B), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(9)(B) (West Supp. 1977).
84. Id.
85. Id. For example, if a proposed agency rule must be published before it can be
implemented, discussion of the proposed rule may not be closed pursuant to subparagraph (B)
of Exemption 9.
The soundness of requiring an agency to open a meeting concerning a proposed agency
action if it is required by law to disclose such information prior to taking final action has been
challenged. See House Hearings 209-10 (prepared statement of Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice).
86. CONFERENCE REPORT 15.
87. See notes 132-34 infra and accompanying text. This policy determination also appears
to be inconsistent with the decision made concerning Exemption 7 in regard to investigative
techniques and procedures. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
88. Sunshine Act § 2 (quoted at note 66 supra).
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openness and public disclosure. As a practical matter, the most significant
protection that this exemption is likely to afford will be to allow agencies to
close discussions of labor negotiation strategy and other collective bargain-
ing problems.8 9
Exemption 10: Issuance of subpoenas and participation in civil actions
or adjudications. The final exemption provided by the Act protects matters
concerning issuance of subpoenas and participation in litigation or agency
adjudications.90 Meetings involving discussion of whether to begin an action
or adjudication may be closed pursuant to this provision. Discussion must
involve a particular case or series of cases; discussion of general adjudica-
tion policies would not be exempt under this provision.91 Underlying this
exemption are the concerns that discussion of litigation strategy may affect
an agency's ability successfully to resolve a case, and that public discussion
of the innocence or guilt of the person involved may injure the person's
reputation and affect the fairness or impartiality of the hearing. 92
Closing agency adjudications to the public will not deprive the public
of all knowledge regarding the adjudication. Adjudications which may be
closed pursuant to this exemption must be decided solely on information in
the record, 93 and the entire record will always be open for public
inspection. 94
89. The Civil Service Commission expressed the view that Exemption 2, covering internal
personnel rules and practices, see note 46 supra, should be modified to cover inter-agency
personnel programs and policies, including government-wide labor-management relations
strategy and negotiation tactics. 2 HOUSE REPORT 35. The Commission has a valid concern in
desiring to keep discussions of inter-agency labor-management strategy and negotiation tactics
private. It would be self-defeating and counterproductive to require the Commission to open
such meetings to the parties with whom they are preparing to negotiate. Fortunately, discus-
sions of negotiation tactics, although not covered by the personnel exemption, should be
protected by subparagraph (B) of Exemption 9.
In the Senate version of the Act, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), there was an additional
subparagraph which authorized the withholding of information which related to the purchase of
real property by an agency. The Act does not have such a provision, but the conferees intended
that "in an appropriate instance" information relating to the purchase of real property by an
agency would be protected by subparagraph (B). CONFERENCE REPORT 15.
90. The exemption protects meetings which
specifically concern the agency's issuance of a subpena, or the agency's participation
in a civil action or proceeding, an action in a foreign court or international tribunal, or
an arbitration, or the initiation, conduct, or disposition by the agency of a particular
case of formal agency adjudication pursuant to the procedures in section 554 of this
title or otherwise involving a determination on the record after opportunity for a
hearing.
Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(10), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(10) (West Supp. 1977).
91. SENATE REPORT 26.
92. Id.; I HOUSE REPORT 12-13.
93. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(10), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(10) (West Supp. 1977). See also 5
U.S.C. § 554 (1970). Section 4 of the Sunshine Act, prohibiting ex parte communications in
formal adjudications, will help to ensure that the cases are decided solely on the basis of the
record. Sunshine Act § 4(a), 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(d) (West Supp. 1977).
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
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SUNSHINE PROCEDURES
Public Announcement of Meetings
Whether a meeting is to be open or closed, the Sunshine Act requires
public announcement of each meeting to be held by the agency at least one
week before the meeting is scheduled to be held. 95 The announcement may
be made less than one week before the meeting only if a majority of the
collegial body determines by a recorded vote that the meeting must be called
at an earlier date due to the urgency of agency business.96 Even under such
circumstances, the announcement must still be made at the "earliest practic-
able time." 97
A recorded vote is not required to change the time or place of a meeting
following the original public announcement, but such a change cannot be
made unless it is publicly announced at the earliest practicable time. 98 After
public announcement of a meeting, if an agency wishes to change the
agenda of a meeting or change the decision to open or. close the meeting, a
majority of the full agency membership must determine by recorded vote
that agency business requires the change and that earlier announcement of
the change was not possible. The nature of the change and the vote of each
member must be publicly announced at the earliest practicable time. 99
Although the notice requirements decrease the agency's flexibility,
advance public notice is necessary in order to make the public's right to
attend meetings a meaningful one. The provisions of this subsection do,
however, take into account situations in which unforeseen circumstances
necessitate a more flexible notice requirement.
For advance notice to be meaningful, reasonable means must be used to
ensure that the public is informed.100 Although the statute sets forth no
particular requirements other than publication in the Federal Register, 10 1
95. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(e)(l) (West Supp. 1977). The announce-
ment must notify the public of the time, place and subject matter of the meeting, whether it is to
be open or closed, and the name and telephone number of the agency-designated official
handling requests for information. Id. Identification of the subject matter of the meeting must
be specific, referring to docket numbers or titles, for example, rather than simply providing a
broad subject heading such as power rates or consumer complaints. SENATE REPORT 29-30; 1
HOUSE REPORT 15.
96. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(e)(l), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(e)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
97. Id. In all instances in which public announcement must be made at the "earliest
practicable time," the conferees intended that the announcement be made "as soon as possible,
which should in few, if any, instances be later than the commencement of the meeting or
portion in question." CONFERENCE REPORT 18.
98. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(e)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(e)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
99. Id.
100. CONFERENCE REPORT 19.
101. All of the information required to be included in the public announcement, along with
[Vol. 1977:565
SUNSHINE ACT OVERVIEW
reasonable means should include posting notices on the agency's public
notice boards, publishing weekly calendars, using agency mailing lists,
publishing notices in publications with readership which might be interested
in agency meetings, and using press releases or recorded telephone mes-
sages. 102 Although these means do not exhaust the possibilities and need not
all be used, agencies should take a pragmatic approach and employ a variety
of measures so that the information is quickly and reliably disseminated.
Procedures to Close Meetings
To close a meeting under one of the exemptions, a majority of the full
membership of the agency must vote to take such action. 103 Each meeting
for which closure is proposed must be voted on separately, 104 except in the
case of a series of meetings concerning the same agenda item which are to
be held within thirty days of the first meeting of the series. 10 5 In such a case,
a single vote may be taken with respect to the whole series.10 6
The vote of each agency member voting on a closure motion is to be
recorded and must be made public within one day of the vote,10 7 in order to
any changes, must be published in the Federal Register immediately following each public
announcement. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(e)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(e)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
102. Id.; SENATE REPORT 30-31.
103. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(d)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(l) (West Supp. 1977). If a meeting of an
agency subdivision is involved, only a majority of the membership of the subdivision would
have to vote to close the meeting. See id.; Sunshine Act § 3(a)(a)(l), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1977).
The requirement that a "majority of the entire membership of the agency" must vote to
close a meeting in order for it to be closed has been criticized as impractical. It has been
suggested that a quorum vote rather than a majority vote should be required. House Hearings
545 (letter of Dec. 8, 1975 from the Office of Management and Budget to Rep. Brooks,
Chairman, House Committee on Government Operations).
In order to assure that personal privacy interests are not overlooked, the Act includes a
provision requiring a recorded vote whenever a person "whose interests may be directly
affected" by a meeting or portion thereof for any of the reasons mentioned in Exemptions 5, 6
or 7 (criminal accusations or formal censure, personal privacy, or investigatory records)
requests closure, and an agency member requests a vote on the matter. Sunshine Act §
3(a)(d)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
104. Sunshine Act 3(a)(d)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(1) (West Supp. 1977). A separate vote
must also be taken "with respect to any information which is proposed to be withheld under
subsection (c)." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(d)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(3) (West Supp. I.977). No proxies are
allowed. Sunshine Act § 3(a) (d)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(1) (West Supp. 1977). A written copy
of all votes taken to close a meeting or series of meetings, or to withhold information (i.e., votes
taken pursuant to subsections 3(a)(d)(1) or 3(a)(d)(2)) must be made public within one day of the
vote, regardless of whether the meeting was voted open or closed. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(d)(3), 5
U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(3) (West Supp. 1977). For any portion of any meeting which is to be closed
to the public, a written explanation of the agency's action along with a list of all persons
expected to be present at the meeting and their affiliation must also be made public within one
day of the vote. Id. The agency's written explanation of its action should be as detailed as
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provide the public with the voting record of agency members on questions of
openness. Although all votes must be recorded, there is no requirement that
the vote be taken at a meeting. Notation voting using a written tally sheet or
ballot would therefore be acceptable. 108 The voting requirement is not
expected to impose a significant administrative burden on the agencies since
it is expected that most agencies will actually seek to close very few
meetings. 109 It must also be remembered that deliberations concerning
closure"0° or the public announcement of a meeting"' 1 are by express
provision not considered "meetings" 112 and are therefore not subject to the
open meeting requirement of subsection (b).
Certain agencies may find that the majority of their meetings fall within
one of the exemptions to the open meeting requirement. In such a case, the
Sunshine Act provides for closure by regulation. 113 Agencies which would
be eligible to close a majority of their meetings pursuant to Exemptions 4, 8,
9(A) or 10114 may promulgate regulations 15 providing for the closing of
such meetings or portions thereof in the event that a majority of the agency
membership elects closure by recorded vote at each exempt meeting, and a
copy of the vote, identifying each member, is made available to the pub-
lic.116 If regulations are employed, voting procedures and the public notice
requirements are relaxed.' 17
The agencies which should be able to employ this section are those
regulating financial institutions, securities or commodities, such as the
possible without disclosing the matter which is intended to be kept secret pursuant to one of the
exemptions. At a minimum, the agency should specify the exemption under subsection (c)
which provides the basis for closing the meeting, and the factors that were considered in making
its decision. SENATE REPORT 28; 1 HOUSE REPORT 13-14.
108. SENATE REPORT 28; 1 HOUSE REPORT 13.
109. See I HOUSE REPORT 15. Voting will not be necessary to hold an open meeting, so the
requirement will only be triggered if the agency itself or some interested private party raises the
closure issue. See note 103 supra.
110. See notes 103-06 supra and accompanying text.
I 11. See notes 95-102 supra and accompanying text.
112. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(a)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
113. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(d)(4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(4) (West Supp. 1977). The promulgation
of regulations must be in accordance with subsection (g). Sunshine Act § 3(a)(g), 5 U.S.C.A. §
552b(g) (West Supp. 1977).
114. See notes 48, 51, 74-78, 90-94 supra and accompanying text.
115. Included in the regulations should be documentation of the likelihood that the agency
will need to close a majority of its meetings pursuant to Exemptions 4, 8, 9(A) or 10, as well as
descriptions of the types of meetings which will be subject to the regulations and a statement of
the exemption(s) relied upon for closure of each type of meeting. SENATE REPORT 29.
116. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(d)(4), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(d)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
117. The provisions of subsection (3) (concerning public notice of meetings) and paragraphs
(1)-(3) of subsection (d) (concerning voting and disclosure of votes) do not apply to a meeting
closed by regulation. Nevertheless, the agency must make a public announcement of the time,
place and subject matter of the meeting at the earliest practicable time. The agency is not
required, however, to disclose material exempt under subsection (c) in the course of making the
announcement. Id.
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Federal Reserve Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
those whose primary business is adjudication, such as the National Labor
Relations Board. I 8 In determining whether it can properly close a majority
of its meetings, an agency should examine its meeting records for recent
years. An agency's asserted need to close a majority of its meetings should
be subjected to careful scrutiny, since this provision is not designed to aid
agencies in circumventing the open meeting requirement. 1 9 Rather, it is
intended to ease an administrative burden in cases in which it might other-
wise be unduly heavy.
Verbatim Transcript Requirement
For each meeting or portion of a meeting which is closed to the public,
the agency must maintain a verbatim transcript or electronic recording of the
proceedings. 120 If a meeting or portion thereof is closed under the exemp-
tions dealing either with information the disclosure of which would be likely
to have specific adverse effects on the agency's operations, 121 reports on
financial institutions ,122 or agency adjudications and participation in litiga-
tion, 123 the agency may maintain a set of minutes in lieu of a transcript or
recording. 124
118. SENATE REPORT 29; 1 HOUSE REPORT 14. Congress did not want to subject these
agencies to the normal voting requirements since they would prove extremely burdensome if
applied to a majority of an agency's meetings. However, Congress believed that there would
still be some meetings conducted by these agencies which could be opened to the public; it
therefore did not want to grant any agency a blanket exemption to the open meeting require-
ment. An amendment to S. 5 to grant such an exemption to the Federal Reserve Board (except
when it dealt with consumer activities) was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 57-36. 121 CONG.
REC. S19434-39 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1975).
119. See note 118 supra.
120. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(f)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(f)(1) (West Supp. 1977). The agency must
also have its chief legal officer certify publicly that the meeting (in his or her opinion) may
properly be closed, specifying the relevant exemptions. Id. The agency is required to retain a
copy of the certification, along with a statement from the agency official presiding over the
meeting which sets forth the time and place of the meeting and the persons in attendance. Id.
A requirement that agencies maintain and make available a set of minutes for all meetings
open to the public was deleted from the final version of the Act. See H.R. 11656,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 3(f)(2) (1976). Minutes of open meetings would be useful; members of the public may not
always attend agency meetings in which they are interested and, more importantly, may not
always receive adequate public notice to make the right to attend meaningful, as in the case of
an emergency meeting. See Sunshine Act § 3(a)(e)(1)-(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(e)(l)-(2) (West
Supp. 1977); see notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text. Congress may have felt that since
the majority of agency meetings are expected to be open, requiring an agency to maintain a set
of minutes for all open meetings would be too costly. See House Hearings 43 (statement of Rep.
Fascell).
121. See notes 74-82 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 51 supra.
123. See notes 90-94 supra and accompanying text.
124. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(f)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(f)(l) (West Supp. 1977):
Such minutes shall fully and clearly describe all matters discussed and shall provide a
full and accurate summary of any actions taken, and the reasons therefor, including a
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The record, minus exemptible material, must be made available
promptly and must be easily accessible to the public. 12 Material which falls
within an exemption may be deleted from the record prior to public disclo-
sure. There is no requirement that the agency follow any set procedure in
determining what material may be deleted; no recorded vote is mandated. 126
The agency need not edit the transcript or recording word for word; if
exemptible material is interspersed throughout a portion of a record so as to
constitute an integral part of the record, no part of that portion need be made
available to the public. 127
Earlier versions of the Act required that the agency provide the public
with a paraphrase or summary of the deleted material, together with the
reason for the deletion and the statutory authority for such action. 128 The
present Act requires neither. 129 Public disclosure of a paraphrase or sum-
mary of the deleted material could conceivably have the same adverse
effects as disclosure of the exempt material itself, such as harm to personal
reputation or encouragement of financial speculation. However, disclosure
of only the reasons for the deletion and the statutory provisions relied on
would not impose on the agency any significant administrative burden, and
would provide the public with an explanation for the action. Lacking even
the barest explanation, it will be difficult for members of the public intelli-
gently to challenge a deletion.130
description of each of the views expressed on any item and the record of any roll-call
vote (reflecting the vote of each member on the question). All documents considered
in connection with any action shall be identified in such minutes.
125. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(f)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(f)(2) (West Supp. 1977). The Senate
Report states that these materials must be "promptly placed in a public document room."
SENATE REPORT 32.
Copies of the record are to be made available at the actual cost of duplication. Sunshine
Act § 3(a)(f)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(f)(2) (West Supp. 1977). A complete copy of the transcript or
minutes, or a complete recording of each meeting (including exemptible material) closed to the
public shall be kept by each agency for two years following the meeting, or until one year after
the conclusion of an agency proceeding relating to the meeting, whichever occurs later. Id. The
provisions of the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-14 (1970), which govern disposal of
records, do not apply to the transcripts, recordings and minutes kept by an agency pursuant to
subsection (f). Sunshine Act § 3(a)(k), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(k) (West Supp. 1977).
126. See Sunshine Act § 3(a)(f)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (f)(2) (West Supp. 1977). Voting on
each deletion was considered to be too time-consuming. 122 CONG. REc. H7872 (daily ed. July
28, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Flowers).
127. SENATE REPORT 31.
128. S. 260, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 201(e) (1974); H.R. 10315, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(f)
(1975).
129. See Sunshine Act § 3(a)(f)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (f)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
130. See 122 CONG. REC. H7886-89 (daily ed. July 28, 1976). By comparison, the provision in
the FOIA allowing deletion from documents which must be publicly disclosed requires that the
justification for the deletion be "explained fully in writing." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (Supp. IV
1974).
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There are three significant considerations underlying the provisions
requiring verbatim records. First, since the Sunshine Act does not, and
could not reasonably, require agency certainty that discussion will actually
disclose exemptible material, the discussion may turn out to be non-exempt
when the meeting does take place. In this situation, the public should have
the opportunity to learn what transpired. Even if there is exemptible material
in the record, it may be contained in an identifiable segment which can be
deleted while still affording the public access to the remaining portions of
the record. Second, verbatim transcripts or recordings assure the public a
meaningful remedy if the meeting was improperly closed-the record can
subsequently be made available to the public. 131 Third, certain matters may
remain sensitive only temporarily; keeping a verbatim record permits an
agency to make the record available once the matters are no longer sensitive.
The legislative history of the Sunshine Act seems to indicate that once
withholding of exempt material contained in a transcript no longer serves the
policy underlying the exemption, the material becomes non-exempt and the
transcript must be disclosed to the public. 132 This is consistent with the Act's
policy of recognizing the public's entitlement to the "fullest practicable
information" with respect to governmental decision-making processes.
133
Thus, for example, a transcript of a meeting concerning an adjudication
closed under Exemption 7 would have to be made available to the public
once the adjudication was over. Similarly, once information discussed in a
meeting closed pursuant to Exemption 9(A) is no longer likely to lead to
significant financial speculation, the transcript of that meeting must be
disclosed. 134
Opposition to the transcript requirement has centered around the con-
cern that the possibility of eventual disclosure will inhibit discussion and
thereby impair the quality of decision-making.135 There is no reason why
131. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(h)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(h)(1) (West Supp. 1977). Verbatim tran-
scripts and recordings will also be useful in litigation in determining if the meeting was
improperly closed, since the court may examine any portion of the material in camera pursuant
to subsection (h). Id.
132. See House Hearings 152 (remarks of Rep. Abzug: "I think that information which is
exempt is exempt for so long as is necessary to carry out the policy underlying the exemption
. . ."); cf. 121 CONG. REC. S19440 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Chiles: "an agency
will not have to review continually the sensitivity of the transcripts of its board meeting. A
periodic review at reasonable intervals is all that is needed"). But see House Hearings 168
(remarks of Rep. Fascell: "Time does not change the exemption").
133. Sunshine Act § 2.
134. Transcripts of discussions closed pursuant to Exemptions 7 and 9 are those most likely
to be required to be disclosed at a subsequent time. It is important to realize, however, that
agencies are only required to maintain a transcript for a specified period of time. See note 125
supra. Thus, disclosure of transcripts of once-exempt discussions must (as a practical matter)
be effected within that period.
135. See I HOUSE REPORT 34 (additional views of Rep. Horton); 2 HOUSE REPORT 33-34
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this should be the case, however, if it is assumed that openness will not in
itself reduce the quality of decision-making. Any discussions which are
exempt from the open meeting requirement may be deleted from the tran-
script which is made available to the public, and agency members should be
able to express their opinions on such matters with unrestrained candor.
Even if the deleted portions of a transcript are later disclosed, this will only
occur following a judicial determination that the material is non-exempt 36
or following an agency determination that there is no longer a need for
withholding under any exemption. In short, discussion in closed meetings
should not be any less candid than in open meetings since the material will
not be disclosed to the public if it is exempt, and if it is disclosed it is
material that properly and candidly could have been discussed at an open
meeting. 137
This is not to say that there will be no burden or possible adverse
effects caused by these provisions, but only that they should be slight and
that they are outweighed by the need for disclosure. This subsection returns
to the public some of the openness taken away by the provisions which give
agencies necessary flexibility in determining whether a meeting should be
closed.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Federal district courts are empowered to enforce the requirements of
the Sunshine Act by injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate relief. 138
The Act grants standing to "any person"; 139 no specific harm to the
person's interests must be shown in order to bring an action against an
agency. 140 This liberal standing provision is consistent with the purpose of
the Act-to open the government to the scrutiny of the public.
Actions may be brought prior to or within sixty days after the meeting
(letter of April 5, 1976 from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to Rep. Rodino), 41
(supplemental views of Rep. Hutchinson and Rep. McCloy).
The concern has also been raised that transcripts will facilitate information leaks. 2 HOUSE
REPORT 41 (supplemental views of Rep. Hutchinson and Rep. McCloy). If the agency exercises
due care in the maintenance of the transcripts, recordings or minutes, however, there should be
no serious problem with information leaks. Maintaining a transcript and disclosing the parts
which are non-exempt will actually reduce the possibility that information relating to the
meeting will be distorted through speculation.
The cost of these provisions is also expected to be minimal, since it is anticipated that
almost all of an agency's meetings will be open. I HoUSE REPORT 15.
136. See Sunshine Act § 3(a)(h)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (h)(l) (West Supp. 1977); see note 147
infra and accompanying text.
137. See note 35 supra.
138. Sunshine Act 3(a)(h)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(h)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
139. Id.
140. The FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1970), and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(g)(l) (Supp. IV 1974), also grant standing without reference to specific harm.
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out of which the alleged violation arises. 141 If public announcement of the
meeting was made improperly, an action may be brought within sixty days
following the improper announcement. 142 There is no requirement that a
plaintiff give notice to the agency prior to filing suit. 143
Defendant agencies have thirty days in which to answer a complaint.1"
The court may examine in camera portions of the transcript, recording or
minutes of a closed meeting, and may take additional evidence if it finds it
necessary.1 45 The burden of proof is on the agency to sustain its actions.
146
The reason for this is twofold. First, the thrust of the Act is to open
governmental decision-making to the public; if an agency conducts its
business in closed meetings, it should have to justify the secrecy. Second,
the agency in most cases is the only party which will have the information
necessary for resolution of the dispute.
The district court may grant equitable relief as it deems appropriate
including declaratory judgments, injunctions against future violations, or
orders requiring disclosure of a transcript or a portion thereof which it has
determined to be properly disclosable. 147 The court has no power to invali-
date, set aside, or enjoin any substantive action taken or discussed at the
meeting out of which the violation arose when the case before it arises solely
from a Sunshine Act violation. 148 Although the invalidation of substantive
action would be a powerful sanction which would provide an agency with an
141. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(h)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(h)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
142. Id.
143. An action may be brought in either the federal district court for the district in which the
meeting was held, the district in which the agency maintains its headquarters, or the District of
Columbia. Id. In earlier versions of the Act suit could also be brought in the district where the
plaintiff resides or has its principal place of business. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(g) (1975),
H.R. 10315, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(h) (1975). The FOIA contains a provision similar to these
early versions of the Sunshine Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). This type of venue
would be more in keeping with the purpose of the Act and with citizen standing. Granting
standing to "any person" and then requiring suit to be brought in most instances in Washington,
D.C. seriously weakens the ability of the general public to litigate under this Act. See House
Hearings 104, 199 (remarks of Rep. Abzug). But see id. 104 (statement of Prof. Jerre Williams,
Chairman, Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association).
144. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(h)(1), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(h)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. There are three instances in which a court could require disclosure of a transcript:
(1) if the meeting was improperly closed; (2) if the meeting was properly closed but the material
turned out to be non-exempt; and (3) if the meeting was properly closed, and the information
was exempt at the time the transcript was publicly disclosed, but later became non-exempt.
If a transcript of a closed meeting is made as required, disclosure of the transcript is a
suitable remedy for a violation of the Act. However, if an agency violates the provisions of the
Act by failing to make a record of a closed meeting, there is no comparable remedy. The same is
true if an agency fails to announce an open meeting, since there is no requirement that a
transcript or minutes of such proceedings be kept.
148. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(h)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(h)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
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incentive to comply with the provisions of the Act, it would also increase
uncertainty regarding agency actions and could seriously impede smooth
administrative functioning. 149
Under a second review provision, if a federal court is otherwise
reviewing agency action, it may , if the issue is properly raised, review a
violation of the Sunshine Act and afford appropriate relief. 150 To come
within this provision, the agency action must be reviewable on other
grounds. 151 In rare instances, a federal court inquiring into a violation under
this paragraph may invalidate substantive agency action on the basis of the
violation, but the violation should be a serious one before the court takes
such action. 152 If the violation was unintentional and did not prejudice the
interests of the party raising the issue, the court should grant other appro-
priate relief. 153 Under certain circumstances, attorney's fees will also be
available to the prevailing party.154
RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACT TO THE FOIA AND PRIVACY ACT
The Sunshine Act states that "nothing herein expands or limits the
present rights of any person" under the FOIA except with respect to the
availability of transcripts, recordings or minutes.' 55 These items are gov-
149. Invalidating substantive agency action would be unduly harsh when there was no hint
of impropriety as to the action itself and there had been substantial reliance on the finality of the
action. Another possible sanction which would probably provide a strong deterrent to violation
of the Act would be the removal from office of any agency official who had repeatedly and
intentionally violated the Act. Senate Hearings 268 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas
Wickham, Univ. of Tennessee).
Numerous state open meeting statutes provide penalties for violations. J. ADAMS, STATE
OPEN MEETING LAWS: AN OVERVIEW 14-17 (Freedom of Information Foundation Series No. 3,
July 1974). Strong objections have been made to the imposition of any type of personal liability
on agency officials. It has been contended that personal liability would inhibit performance of
duties and discourage individuals from accepting agency appointments. 122 CONG. REC. H7870
(daily ed. July 28, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Horton). It has also been claimed that personal
liability would amount to "a breach of the doctrine that action taken by United States em-
ployees as part of their official duties does not subject them to personal responsibility." 121
CONG. REC. S19378 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1975) (Sen. Percy, quoting Justice Department
memorandum).
A sanction that would be available only after repeated intentional violations should not
inhibit officials in the performance of the their duties, however. Moreover, such liability would
not violate the doctrine of qualified immunity since, if an official had repeatedly and willfully
violated the provisions of the Act, that official would not have been acting in good faith or
within the scope of his employment. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
150. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(h)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(h)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
151. Id.
152. CONFERENCE REPORT 23.
153. Id.
154. The court may assess against the losing party attorney's fees and litigation costs
incurred by the party who "substantially prevails." Sunshine Act § 3(a)(i), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(i)
(West Supp. 1977). Costs may not be assessed against the plaintiff, however, unless the court
determines that the action was initiated for "frivolous or dilatory purposes." Id.
155. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(k), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(k) (West Supp. 1977).
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erned by the Sunshine Act if they are required to be kept and made available
by its provisions.1 56
Although the Act purports not to affect the FOIA except with regard to
the availability of transcripts, there seem to be instances in which material
which is authorized to be withheld under the FOIA would be required to be
disclosed under this Act since the exemptions of the Sunshine Act do not
parallel all the exemptions of the FOIA. For example, since the Sunshine
Act has no exemption which is parallel to the inter-agency and intra-agency
memorandum exemption of the FOIA,1 57 discussion of information con-
tained in such memoranda must be held publicly unless the information falls
within one of the new statute's ten exemptions. Similarly, if discussion of a
memorandum occurs in a closed meeting and the information discussed is
not covered by one of the Act's exemptions, the portion of the transcript of
that meeting containing the discussion must be made public. 158 The informa-
tion contained in the memorandum would not be entitled to Exemption 3
protection, which extends to "matters specifically exempted from disclo-
sure by statute. . . ," since the exemption specifically excludes the FOIA
from its coverage. 159
The Privacy Act' 6° is in no way affected by the Sunshine Act.161
Records which are accessible to an individual under the Privacy Act cannot
be withheld by an agency pursuant to the provisions of this Act even if they
are contained in transcripts, recordings or minutes of properly closed
meetings.
CONCLUSION
The Sunshine Act's recognition of the public's entitlement to the
"fullest practicable information regarding the decision-making processes of
the Federal Government" 162 has provided the public with a truly meaningful
opportunity to observe firsthand the workings of collegial federal agencies.
The use of the word "practicable" evidences Congress' awareness of the
need to balance openness with other concerns, such as the needs for personal
privacy and administrative efficiency and flexibility. In balancing these
156. Id. Although the availability of transcripts, recordings, and minutes of closed meetings
is governed by this Act, they are still subject to any other pertinent FOIA requirements, such as
indexing. SENATE REPORT 39.
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970). The Sunshine Act also has no exemption which is parallel to
Exemption 9 of the FOIA protecting "geological and geophysical information and data, includ-
ing maps, concerning wells." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9) (1970).
158. See note 28 supra.
159. Sunshine Act § 3(a)(c)(3), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(c)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
160. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV 1974). For a thorough discussion and analysis of this
legislation see The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview, 1976 DUKE L.J. 301.
161. See Sunshine Act § 3(a)(m), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(m) (West Supp. 1977).
162. Sunshine Act § 2.
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concerns Congress has done a commendable job of drafting a law which
achieves its goals of providing the public with an important right while
retaining significant flexibility and otherwise imposing as slight an adminis-
trative burden as possible.
There are certain provisions of the Act which will probably cause
confusion and unnecessary litigation. Some provisions have struck a balance
that will inevitably be viewed by some as going too far and by others as not
going far enough. However, the flaws in the Act and the fears that accom-
pany change must not be projected out of proportion so as to obscure the
considerable accomplishments of this legislation.
